SUMMARY: Prior studies document a negative market reaction to going concern opinions. We extend this literature by focusing on the link between the going concern opinion and the cost of equity capital. Using two different samples (one comprising distressed firms and the other matched on propensity score), we document a significant positive association between the issuance of the going concern opinion and the firm's subsequent cost of equity capital. This result is robust to sensitivity tests using various subsamples, time periods, and multiple methods for computing the cost of equity capital. We also examine the association between changes in the audit opinion (going concern to clean opinion and vice versa) and subsequent changes in cost of equity. We find that the cost of equity increases between 3.3 percent and 5.7 percent for firms that receive a first-time going concern opinion. This evidence illuminates the relevance of going concern opinions and the value of the information embedded in them.
INTRODUCTION

S tatement on Auditing Standards
provides guidelines for auditors to assess the going concern ability of a company.
1 If, upon examining the client's financial condition along with mitigating factors and other evidence, the auditor has ''substantial doubt'' that the client will continue as a going concern for a period not exceeding 12 months, the auditor must include an explanatory paragraph (hereafter, GC opinion or GCO) in the Keval Amin is an Assistant Professor at Stony Brook University, SUNY; Jagan Krishnan is a Professor at Temple University; and Joon Sun Yang is an Associate Professor at Sogang University. audit report. Although auditors are not expected to predict bankruptcy, they are frequently criticized when their clients file for bankruptcy within 12 months of receiving unqualified (or clean) audit reports with no going concern modification (Venuti 2004) . For example, in a recent speech, a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) board member cited the absence of going concern modified opinions in eight out of ten bankruptcies that occurred during the 2008 financial crisis (Harris 2011) .
2 Auditors also face the risk of litigation when the audit reports of bankrupt companies do not contain a GC opinion for the year preceding bankruptcy.
3 Thus, the going concern audit report is often construed as an early warning to investors about an impending bankruptcy (Geiger and Raghunandan 2002b) .
We study the effect of this early warning signal by examining whether companies that receive a GC opinion suffer a subsequent increase in cost of obtaining equity capital from investors. Recent research (e.g., Menon and Williams 2010) documents a negative stock market reaction to the issuance of a GC opinion. The negative reaction has been attributed to possible violation of debt covenants (Dodd, Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich 1984) , new information on lending negotiations and increased contracting costs (Menon and Williams 2010) , and uncertainties about future earnings or cash flows (Fleak and Wilson 1994) . These factors could reduce a firm's value, either because of an expected reduction in future earnings or cash flows or through an increased discount rate (or cost of capital) that investors apply to future cash flows. Hribar and Jenkins (2004) make a similar argument in examining the effect of restatements on future earnings and cost of capital.
We posit that the issuance of a GC opinion can result in an increase in a firm's cost of equity. The GC opinion can be associated with the firm's systematic risk through, for example, an increase in debt risk (Fargher and Wilkins 1998) . Since systematic risk is associated with the cost of equity (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 2004) , the issuance of a GC opinion can lead to a higher cost of equity capital. 4 Also, the GC opinion signals a violation of the going concern assumption, which is the basis for financial reporting. 5 This violation potentially diminishes the quality of information about the firm, causing investors to demand a higher risk premium and, therefore, charge a higher cost of capital (Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007) .
Using two samples of publicly traded companies for the period 2000-2010, one including distressed firms only and the other matched on propensity scores, we test the association between the GC opinion and the cost of equity capital. We document a significant positive association 2 Board member Harris (2011) went on to say, ''others have asked 'where were the auditors during the financial crisis, what were the auditors' responsibilities and how could companies so close to bankruptcy or in such need of assistance have escaped a going concern opinion?' And, if auditors were correct in not issuing going concern opinions or in not sending any other message to investors about the financial and accounting issues they were seeing inside these institutions, what does that say about the relevance and usefulness of the current auditor reporting model?'' 3 A recent example is the high-profile bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Ernst & Young LLP, the auditor, expressed a clean opinion in the audit report that was issued immediately preceding the company's bankruptcy filing. Civil claims were filed against Ernst & Young LLP by the New York attorney general (Newquist 2010) . In another case, a lawsuit was filed against Ernst & Young LLP by the trustees of Taurus Foods, Inc., a small company that was forced into bankruptcy by three of its creditors. The trustees alleged that Ernst & Young LLP was ''negligent in failing to include a going-concern qualification in its 1995 audit report.'' Although the plaintiff's claim was rejected by the district court as well as the appeals court, this is a case where the lawsuit was triggered by the absence of a GC opinion preceding the bankruptcy (United States Seventh Circuit 2007). 4 Thus, we expect a positive association between the bankruptcy risk stemming from a GC opinion and systematic risk.
Evidence contrary to this is provided in Dichev (1998) , who shows that bankruptcy risk is not related to systematic risk, where systematic risk is proxied by future realized returns. However, Kim (2013, 292) shows that the association between bankruptcy risk and subsequent returns is ''construct-dependent: some measures of bankruptcy risk predict future returns, while others do not. '' 5 That is, the going concern assumption refers to the assumption held by financial statement preparers and users that an entity will continue to operate into the foreseeable future.
The going concern opinion has also received international attention in recent years. The newly issued Canadian Auditing Standards (which move closer to the International Auditing Standards) require auditors to include an emphasis paragraph if there are uncertainties relating to the going concern ability of the company (Beaudin 2009 ). Previously, unlike the U.S. auditing standards, the Canadian standards did not require reference to going concern uncertainties in the auditor's report. The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) has proposed requiring auditors to comment on the ''appropriateness of management's use of the going-concern assumption'' (Carson et al. 2013, 376) . Again, our results, indicating the usefulness of the GC opinion, are consistent with the Canadian requirements and the call for expanded disclosures by the IAASB.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. The next section provides background information related to going concern opinions and develops our main hypothesis. This is followed by a discussion of our research design, empirical results, and additional analyses and robustness checks. The last section provides concluding remarks.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS
SAS No. 59, which was issued in 1988 (adopted by the PCAOB in 2003, PCAOB [2003] ), provides the current auditing standards relating to auditors' responsibility for going concern assessment. SAS No. 59 superseded Statement on Auditing Standards No. 34 (AICPA 1981) , which was issued in 1981. SAS No. 59 increased auditors' responsibility concerning the going concern opinion (Raghunandan and Rama 1995; Carcello, Hermanson, and Huss 1997) . Under SAS No. 34, auditors were only required to provide negative assurance regarding the client entity's going concern status. Thus, auditors would typically consider issuing a going concern opinion when additional audit procedures revealed contradictory evidence regarding a company's status. In contrast, SAS No. 59 specifically requires the auditor to evaluate whether there is ''substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed one year beyond the date of the financial statements being audited' ' (AICPA 1988) . This implies a positive duty whereby an auditor must perform work that directly considers the going concern status of a client, making it more likely (ceteris paribus) that a client will receive a GC opinion.
Prior research on the GC opinion that is relevant to our study can be divided into three categories: studies that examine the GC opinion as an early warning signal before bankruptcy, studies that examine the market reaction to a GC opinion, and studies that focus on clients' reluctance to receive a GC opinion because of negative consequences.
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Studies that examine the GC opinion as an early warning signal before bankruptcy look at bankruptcies and the audit reports preceding them. These studies find that, on average, more than 50 percent of bankruptcies are preceded by GC opinions (Feldmann and Read 2010) . Chen and Church (1996) examine the association between GC opinions issued under SAS No. 34 and the market reaction to subsequent bankruptcy filings. They argue that GC opinions provide early warning signals to investors and, therefore, investors are not surprised when these firms go bankrupt. Their results are consistent with their expectations, i.e., companies with GC opinions that file for bankruptcy exhibit lower negative excess returns compared to companies that file for bankruptcy after receiving an unqualified report. 9 A number of studies also examine the determinants of the GC opinion; for example, Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1987) and Francis and Krishnan (1999) . See Carson et al. (2013) for a comprehensive synthesis of research relating to going concern opinions. Holder-Webb and Wilkins (2000) extend the Chen and Church (1996) study using GC opinions issued under SAS No. 59. They argue that GC opinions issued under SAS No. 59 should further reduce the uncertainty about bankruptcy filings because it (SAS No. 59) increased auditor responsibility and improved communication relating to a company's GC status. Their results suggest that the stock price reaction to a bankruptcy filing is less negative for GC companies compared to companies with unqualified audit reports. They further document that the stock price reaction to bankruptcy filing is less negative for companies with GC opinions issued under SAS No. 59 than those with GC opinions issued under SAS No. 34.
A second set of studies focuses on the market response to GC opinions, and yields mixed results. Early studies include GC opinions in samples of auditors' qualified opinions. Dodd et al. (1984) , using 604 first-time audit qualifications (at that time, ''subject to'' qualifications and ''disclaimers'') during the period 1973 to 1976, do not find a statistically significant association between the initial public announcement of ''subject to'' audit opinions and stock prices, but find a negative stock price reaction to the announcement of disclaimers. Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1986) find negative price reactions to media disclosures of ''subject to'' opinions. Elliott (1982) documents significant negative abnormal returns during a 45-week period before the release of ''subject to'' opinions. Using 247 U.K. companies that received qualified opinions, Firth (1978) finds that there were significant negative abnormal returns for asset value and going concern qualifications. In contrast to the above studies, which examine qualified opinions (including going concern opinions), two studies examine market reaction to GC opinions alone. Fleak and Wilson (1994) examine the market reaction to unexpected GC opinions for the period 1979-1986 using a discriminant model to predict the GC opinion. They find that the market reacts negatively to unexpected GC opinions. Menon and Williams (2010) examine the market reaction to GC opinions for the period 1995-2006, and document a negative abnormal return for companies that receive first-time GC opinions. The reaction is more negative when the GC condition is surrounded by problems relating to financing, or when there is a violation of a debt covenant.
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Related to the above, Blay, Geiger, and North (2011) examine the impact of a first-time going concern opinion on market valuation of individual financial statement items and document that when a company receives a GC opinion for the first time, market valuation shifts from a focus on income statement and balance sheet items to the balance sheet items alone. Furthermore, the market devalues inventory and weighs cash, receivables, and long-term liabilities more heavily following the receipt of a GC opinion. Overall, the results of this study suggest that the GC opinion is incrementally value relevant because it serves to communicate the auditor's business risk evaluation of its client to the equity markets.
A third stream of research shows that clients resist receiving GC opinions because of the consequences associated with them (Krishnan and Stephens 1995; Geiger and Raghunandan 2001) . One consequence identified in the literature is an increase in the cost of capital due to uncertainty over a firm's continued survival (Geiger and Raghunandan 2001) . Since the audit report containing a GC opinion specifically states that there is ''substantial doubt'' that the client may not continue as a ''going concern,'' equity and debt holders may view a GCO as a negative signal and therefore be reluctant to invest in or lend to the company. Some studies show that, possibly because of these expected consequences, the client may change auditors with the intent of obtaining a more favorable opinion (DeFond and Subramanyam 1998) . Another reason a client may resist a GC opinion is the fear that it may deter creditors and suppliers from renegotiating contract terms (Louwers 1998) , thus accelerating bankruptcy. The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (CAR 1978, 30) observes that ''the auditor's expression of uncertainty about the company's ability to continue may make the company's inability a certainty.''
Hypothesis
While prior studies have conjectured that the receipt of a GC opinion is costly to the client and have alluded to the possible increase in cost of capital, no study, to our knowledge, has examined whether the cost of equity capital increases following the GC opinion. We focus on the cost of equity capital because, when compared to debt financing, equity financing is a more expensive option for firms. Generally, the anticipated rate of return for investors is significantly higher for equity than for debt, because equity financing exposes investors to greater risk than debt financing. With equity financing, firms are usually not legally obliged to make regular payments to the investors, as they are with debt financing. Furthermore, equity financing offers capital to the firm without increasing the firm's leverage. Equity holders cannot force a firm into bankruptcy as debt holders can.
There are at least three reasons to expect an association between the GC opinion and the cost of equity. First, a GC opinion, which is indicative of the violation of a fundamental assumption underlying the financial statements, signals lower information quality.
11 Lambert et al. (2007) document that lower information quality creates uncertainty about future cash flows, thus resulting in higher COE. We argue therefore that the lower information quality and the consequent uncertainty about future cash flows created by a GC opinion can result in a higher COE.
Second, the going concern opinion may be positively associated with a firm's systematic risk, which has been shown to be related to the cost of equity capital (e.g., Francis et al. 2004) . For example, when GC problems relate to potential debt defaults (Chen and Church 1993) , the firm's default risk contributes to overall systematic risk. Some recent studies show that a company's systematic risk is associated with financial distress (Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi 2008; Gay, Lin, and Smith 2011; French 1995, 1996) and, more specifically, with the going concern opinion (Fargher and Wilkins 1998). As noted above, prior studies provide evidence of a positive association between a company's systematic risk and the cost of equity capital. Thus, we expect a positive association between the GC opinion and the cost of equity capital.
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Third, unlike in other situations of financial distress, a going concern opinion involves an independent party (in this case the auditor) expressing an opinion that there is substantial doubt that the company will continue as a going concern. Such an opinion may signal rare bad news and, consequently, can increase return volatility (Rogers, Skinner, and Van Buskirk 2009) . Although there is inconsistency in findings across studies (Goyal and Santa-Clara 2003; Bali, Cakici, Yan, and Zhang 2005) , there is some evidence that return volatility is positively associated with cost of 11 Carson et al. (2013) note that ''a going concern opinion provides a warning to lenders that the liquidation values of assets are likely to be substantially less than book values in the event of bankruptcy.'' 12 By contrast, Dichev (1998) documents that bankruptcy risk is nonsystematic, thus implying that bankruptcy risk may be idiosyncratic and could be diversified away. If so, we would not observe an association between GC opinion and COE. However, Kim (2013) demonstrates that Dichev's (1998) results hold when Ohlson's bankruptcy measure is used but not when an alternative measure of bankruptcy, BSM_prob, developed by Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt (2004) that is based on Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) equity. Thus, if a GC opinion triggers greater return volatility, we would expect the issuance of the GC opinion to lead to a higher cost of equity.
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Therefore we hypothesize the following:
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between the issuance of a GC opinion and the subsequent cost of equity.
RESEARCH DESIGN
We present two regression models. The first model, based on Khurana and Raman (2006) (hereafter, parsimonious model), is as follows:
The second model (hereafter, extended model) includes additional variables identified in Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan (2007) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009):
We employ two models because of the nature of our data. The construction of the cost of equity variable requires the use of analyst data. Because it is typically smaller firms that face going concern problems and these firms are less likely to be followed by analysts, the construction of cost of equity results in substantial sample attrition. 14 Computation of the additional variables (probability of bankruptcy, analyst bias, future growth, and proportion of incidence of losses in the previous three years) included in Model (2) results in a further loss of a large number of going concern opinion (GCO) observations. Consequently, the power of our tests and the representativeness of our sample could be diminished.
GCO is our test variable, coded 1 when the auditor's opinion is a going concern modification, and 0 otherwise. Consistent with our hypothesis, we expect b 1 and k 1 to be positive and significant. That is, holding all other factors constant, a going concern modification will be associated with an increased cost of equity. We also split GC opinions into first-time GC opinions (GCOFT) and recurring GC opinions (GCORECUR), and include them in place of GCO.
The dependent variable, COE, is computed as follows:
where: 14 We lose about 86 percent of the initial GC observations because of the unavailability of analyst data, whereas only 40 percent of the non-GC observations have missing analyst data.
P 0 ¼ price per share at the end of four months after fiscal year-end. We follow Khurana and Raman (2006) by allowing a four-month lag from the end of the fiscal year to enable the information contained in the auditor's report to be impounded in the stock price.
To compute COE, we impose the constraint that eps 2 . eps 1 . 0, so that the solution to the above equation will be a positive root (Easton 2004; Botosan and Plumlee 2005; Khurana and Raman 2006) . All of the independent variables are defined in Appendix A. Our COE specification above is based on the Easton (2004) (2005) evaluate these models and provide evidence that the PEG approach outperforms the other approaches to computing cost of capital.
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The control variables used in this study are drawn from previous research, e.g., Khurana and Raman (2006) , , and Krishnan, Li, and Wang (2013) . Three variables, BETA, LLEV, and VAR capture risk. BETA captures a firm's systematic risk, and LLEV is financial leverage. We predict BETA and LLEV to be positively associated with the cost of equity. VAR is the dispersion in analysts' forecasts of earnings, which we use as a proxy for earnings variability. Since variability in earnings increases perceived risk, we expect VAR to be positively associated with COE.
The other control variables include firm size (LSIZE) as measured by the log of the market value of common equity, the book-to-market ratio (LBM) as measured by the log of the ratio of book value of equity to the market value of equity, the standard deviation of the residual from the market model (RMSE), and the most recent available one-year stock return (RECRET). As noted by Khurana and Raman (2006) and Gebhardt et al. (2001) , stocks of larger firms are more liquid than those of smaller firms due to the greater availability of information about the former. The greater information content reduces information risk, and consequently LSIZE is expected to be negatively associated with COE. The book-to-market ratio (LBM) captures equity risk (Fama and French 1992) and, accordingly, we expect it to be positively associated with COE. Khurana and Raman (2006) posit that the cost of equity capital for U.S. firms is influenced by litigation risk. Following Stice (1991) , we use the variance of abnormal returns from the market model (RMSE) to proxy for litigation risk, and expect it to be positively associated with COE. Khurana and Raman (2006, 988) also point out that ''if recent stock returns have been high (low), the analysts' earnings forecasts are likely to be too low (high) due to sluggishness in updating the positive (negative) information impounded in recent stock returns.'' Therefore we include RECRET, and expect it to be negatively associated with COE.
To control for the effect of audit quality on COE, we add a dummy variable coded 1 if the auditor is a Big N auditor, and 0 otherwise (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009 ). Geiger and Rama (2006) find that Big N auditors have lower Type 1 and Type 2 errors with respect to GC opinions, and it is therefore necessary to control for Big N. 16 Finally, we include year and industry dummies to control for differences over time and across industries.
In the extended model (Model 2), we include four additional variables. To control for financial distress, we include PRBANK and PLOSS. PRBANK is the probability of bankruptcy computed 15 In sensitivity tests (reported later), we use other measures of COE and find similar results to those reported using the Easton (2004) model. 16 A Type 1 error occurs when an auditor issues a GC opinion to a client that subsequently does not fail (i.e., declare bankruptcy). A Type 2 error occurs when an auditor does not issue a GC opinion to a client that subsequently declares bankruptcy.
using the Zmijewski (1984) model. 17 PLOSS is the proportion of losses that a firm reports in the previous three fiscal years. We expect PRBANK and PLOSS to be positively associated with COE. find that analyst forecast optimism increases COE. We include BIAS to control for this optimism. Because Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) document a positive association between sales growth and COE, we include RGROWTH to control for sales growth.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In Table 1 , Panel A, we describe our sample selection procedure for GCO and NGCO firms. We construct two different samples. The first sample (hereafter, full sample) consists of GCO observations, and all available financially distressed NGCO observations. The second sample (hereafter, matched sample) consists of GCO observations and a propensity score matched sample of NGCO observations.
We start with all firms covered by the Audit Analytics database from 2000 to 2010. The initial sample consists of 185,278 firm-year observations (Column 3 in Table 1 , Panel A). We exclude 71,125 firm-year observations for companies in the financial services industry (SIC codes 6000-6999). We require sample firms to have data required to compute the cost of equity estimated by the PEG approach, as well as analysts' earnings forecasts and price data from the I/B/E/S database. This reduces the sample by 88,543 firm-year observations. We then eliminate firm-year observations for which complete data for our control variables were not available on the Compustat and CRSP databases. Finally, we eliminate firms that are not financially distressed, because going concern opinions are generally issued to distressed companies (Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler 1994; DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam 2002) . 18 This leaves us with a sample of 114 GCO and 5,343 NGCO firm-year observations.
For the matched sample, we start with the 114 GCO firm-year observations and generate a second sample of NGCO firms using the propensity score matching procedure. Identifying a control sample using propensity score matching allows us to estimate the effect of our treatment (GC opinion) by accounting for other variables that may predict the treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) . 19 A treatment firm and a control firm with similar propensity scores will be similar to each other across covariates that may predict a GC opinion. We first compute the propensity scores (i.e., predicted probabilities) by estimating a logistic regression model based on Krishnan, Raghunandan, and Yang (2007) . 20 For each GCO observation, we then locate a matching NGCO observation (within each year and industry) based on the propensity score that is closest to that of the GCO firm. We eliminate eight GCO firms lacking the data required to compute the propensity score. The final matched sample includes 106 GCO and 106 NGCO firm-year observations. 17 PRBANK is calculated for each observation as Y ¼À4.803 À 3.599 Ã ROA þ 5.406 Ã FINL À 0.1 Ã LIQ. ROA is return on assets (net income to total assets); FINL ¼ financial leverage (total debt to total assets); and LIQ ¼ liquidity (current assets to current liabilities). PRBANK ¼ F(Y) where F( ) is the distribution function of the standard normal variable. 18 Following previous research (e.g., Reynolds and Francis 2001; DeFond et al. 2002) , we define distressed firms as those that have negative cash flows from operations or negative net income. 19 Our sample of GCO firms is not comparable to those used in previous studies because the COE computation requires the availability of analyst forecast data. Companies that are followed by analysts tend to be relatively large (e.g., Freeman 1987) . We acknowledge that our results may not be generalizable to the population of firms, but note that this is a problem faced by all studies that use analyst data. The use of propensity scoring mitigates the effects of these differences since it provides a control firm, similar in its key attributes, for each GCO firm in our sample. 20 Krishnan et al. (2007) use PRBANK, LNASSET, LOSS, and INVEST as determinants of GC opinion, i.e., Prob(GC ¼ 1) ¼ f(PRBANK, LNASSET, LOSS, INVEST) where PRBANK is the probability of bankruptcy; LNASSET is the natural logarithm of total assets; LOSS is a dummy variable coded 1 if the net income is negative, and 0 otherwise; and INVEST is the ratio of investments in short-and long-term securities and total assets. Table 1 , Panel B shows that the number of observations for the full sample (matched sample) varies between 250 (6) and 811 (66) across the sample years. The maximum number of GCO observations occurs in year 2008 for both samples, consistent with Carson et al.'s (2013) observation that 2008 was a year when companies faced ''exceptional risks'' at the height of the banking crisis. Table 1 , Panel C provides a breakdown of the sample by industry. Over 56 percent of the total observations in the full sample (60 percent in the matched sample) are from the 
Total (6)   2000  8  242  250  7  7  14  2001  7  372  379  6  6  12  2002  6  361  367  5  5  10  2003  4  368  372  3  3  6  2004  7  349  356  7  7  14  2005  6  409  415  6  6  12  2006  8  524  532  6  6  12  2007  9  673  682  9  9  18  2008  35  776  811  33  33  66  2009  14  715  729  14  14  28  2010  10  554  564  10  10  20  Total  114  5,343  5,457  106  106  212 (continued on next page) manufacturing industry, followed by the service (17.8 percent) and transportation and utilities (7.9 percent) industries in the full sample, and followed by the mining (15.1 percent) and transportation and utilities (14.2 percent) industries in the matched sample. Descriptive statistics in Table 2 , Panel A provide an overview of how the data are distributed for the dependent, test, and control variables. 2.1 percent of the firm-year observations in the full sample (50 percent in the matched sample, by construction) received GC opinions. The mean cost of equity is 0.183 (0.263) for the full sample (matched sample), suggesting that investors demanded, on average, a rate of return of 18.3 percent (26.3 percent). Table 2 , Panel B presents univariate tests for comparisons of means and medians for the GCO and NGCO firms. The cost of equity is greater for firms that received a GC opinion compared to the firms that did not receive a GC opinion. The mean and median COE for the GCO full sample (matched sample) firms are 0.287 and 0.261, respectively (0.293 and 0.273, respectively), which are greater than the mean and median for the NGCO firms. These differences are statistically significant with p-values , 0.01. For the full sample, mean and median VAR and RMSE for the GCO firms are higher than those for the NGCO firms, consistent with the risky nature of the GCO firms. Consistent with prior work (e.g., Dopuch et al. 1987; Geiger and Raghunandan 2002a) , GCO firms are smaller (SIZE, LSIZE), less profitable (RECRET, PLOSS), more distressed (PRBANK), and more leveraged (LEV, LLEV) than NGCO firms. In addition, compared to NGCO firms, GCO firms have a higher forecast bias (BIAS) and are less likely to be audited by the Big N audit firms. The matched sample indicates fewer differences for the control variables than the full sample: GCO firms are smaller (SIZE, LSIZE), have lower stock returns (RECRET), and are less likely to be audited by Big N auditors. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Table 2 , Panel C presents univariate statistics for the change in cost of equity for firms that changed and did not change GC status. The number of observations is lower compared with those in Panels A and B because of the requirement that COE data be available for two consecutive years. For the full sample, companies receiving a GC opinion for the first time (i.e., changing from NGCO to GCO status) exhibit an increase in mean COE of about 51 percent (i.e., (0.302 À 0.200)/0.200). When the GC opinion is removed (GCO to NGCO), the mean COE decreases by 22.7 percent (although with weak statistical significance). One explanation for the weak statistical significance is that the market continues to be skeptical about the going concern situation and is not quick to assume that all is well, even though the GCO modification has been removed. Note also that the number of observations (24) is relatively small, which may affect the power of the test. For the matched sample, firms receiving a GC opinion for the first time exhibit an increase in COE of 51 percent. Companies with clean opinions in both years (NGCO to NGCO) exhibit an increase in COE in the full, but not in the matched, sample.
21 Overall, Table 2 , Panel C suggests that the receipt (removal) of a GCO is associated with an increase (decrease) in COE.
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Appendix B provides the logistic regression estimates for the model used to generate the propensity matched scores. The dependent variable is coded 1 for GCO firms, and 0 otherwise. All four variables used in the model are highly significant and the explanatory power of the model is 0.16. The ROC curve statistic of 0.935 suggests that the model has good fit.
Panels A-D of Table 3 provide correlation matrices showing the correlation coefficients among the variables. The results are displayed for both Spearman and Pearson correlations. All correlation coefficients are below 0.55 (with the exception of the correlation between LLEV and PRBANK in both samples) 23 and the variance inflation factors for the variables reported in the correlation matrix are below 3. 24 Therefore we do not have concerns relating to multicollinearity. Table 4 , Panel A provides the ordinary least squares estimates for the full sample. As previously stated, we present results for two models, one based on a parsimonious set of variables (Columns 1-3) and the other including an extended set of variables (Columns 4-6). Columns 1 and 4 present the results for the model with GCO as the test variable. The explanatory power of each model is high (0.284 for the parsimonious model and 0.315 for the extended model) and consistent with previous studies that have used U.S. data (for example, Khurana and Raman 2006; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009 ).
Consistent with our hypothesis, GCO is positively associated with the cost of equity (p-value , 0.05). The effect on COE is economically significant, i.e., the going concern opinion is associated with an increase of 4.6 percent (2.5 percent) in COE in the parsimonious (extended) model. BETA, VAR, and RMSE are positive and significant in both models, consistent with the expectation that riskier firms will have higher cost of equity. Smaller firms (LSIZE) and firms that are less profitable (RECRET) face higher COE. In the extended model, firms that are more 21 One explanation for the increase in COE for these companies is that the variables that proxy for risk (LEV, VAR, BM, PRBANK, RMSE) have increased in year t as compared to year tÀ1, while the variable that proxies for returns (RECRET) has decreased. 22 Following Hribar and Jenkins (2004) , we also examined the revisions in analyst forecasts. To remove the effect of stale forecasts, we restricted the sample observations (as in Hribar and Jenkins's [2004] Table 2 , Panel B) to those with explicit revisions of analyst forecasts after the opinion is issued. The general tenor of the results is that the oneyear-ahead and two-year-ahead revisions in forecasts are more negative for GCO than for NGCO observations, although the results for the two-year-ahead revisions are less consistent across our samples and models. Overall, we find (similar to Hribar and Jenkins's (2004) findings relating to restatements) that GC opinions cause both a revision of forecasts (i.e., a reduction in expected cash flows) and an increase in cost of capital. 23 Our results are similar (for both samples) when we drop LLEV and PRBANK, in turn, from the model. 24 However, the variance inflation factors for some industry and year dummies are above 10. Our results are robust to the exclusion of year and industry dummies. distressed (PRBANK, PLOSS) and those with higher forecast bias (BIAS) and lower growth (RGROWTH) have higher COE. In Table 4 , Columns 2 and 5, we split GC opinions into first-time GC opinions (GCOFT) and recurring GC opinions (GCORECUR). The coefficient on GCOFT is positive (0.065) and significant (p-value , 0.01), and significantly (p , 0.05) larger in magnitude than the coefficient on GCORECUR (0.024) in the parsimonious model. However, the difference in coefficients between GCOFT and GCORECUR is not significantly different in the extended model. In Table 4 , Columns 3 and 6, we present estimates of the model that includes only the first-time GC opinion, i.e., we drop firm-year observations with recurring GC opinions. The coefficient on GCOFT is 0.065 (0.020), similar to that in Column 2 (5).
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In Table 4 , Panel B, we present the OLS regression results for the matched sample. The coefficients on the GC variables (GCO, GCOFT, and GCORECUR) are significant in all columns, and vary between 0.032 and 0.066. However, the coefficients on GCOFT and GCORECUR are not significantly different. Unlike in Panel A, there are fewer control variables that are significantly 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed).
a The dependent variable is the ex ante cost of equity capital estimated using the price-earnings-growth (PEG) approach.
b
We include seven industry dummies using the classification reported in Panel C of Table 1 . associated with COE because of the propensity score matching procedure used to generate the control sample of NGCO firms.
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ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
Our additional analyses serve to examine the robustness and sensitivity of our main results using the Big N subsample, alternative measures of cost of equity, various subperiods, change analysis, controls for endogeneity, and other sensitivity tests.
Big N Subsample
We estimate our model for Big N clients separately, since these companies compose a large majority of our full sample. 27 As in the earlier analysis, we use the PEG method to estimate cost of equity. Our test variables are indicators for first-time GC opinion (GCOFT) and recurring GC opinion (GCORECUR). Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 present our results for the Big N client subsample, for the full and matched samples respectively, using the parsimonious model. Columns 3 and 4 present the results for the extended model. The coefficient on GCOFT is positive and significant in all four columns with p , 0.05. Unlike the results in Table 4 that includes non-Big N clients, recurring GC opinions are not significantly associated with cost of equity for Big N clients.
Other Measures of COE
Our primary analysis is based on cost of equity computed using the PEG approach. To test whether our results are sensitive to our measure of cost of equity, we use a modified version (modified Easton) of the Easton (2004) model and the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (OJN) (2005) model as alternative estimates of cost of equity.
28 Table 5 , Panel B presents the results using the two measures for the full and matched samples: for the parsimonious model in Columns 1-4, and the extended model in Columns 5-8. As with our previous models, we include both GCOFT and GCORECUR as our test variables.
The results in all eight columns indicate a positive association between GCOFT and the cost of equity. Furthermore, our results indicate a significant positive association between GCORECUR and subsequent cost of equity for the full and propensity matched samples using the parsimonious model, and for the full sample using the extended model. We find no such association for the propensity matched sample using the extended model. Overall, the results generated by these tests show that our primary findings are robust to alternative measures of COE. 26 We used the regression diagnostic DFFITS to check if a few observations could be influencing our results. The absolute value of DFFITS is less than 1 for all observations in the full sample (for both parsimonious and extended models) and for most observations in the matched sample. We conclude that the results are not driven by a few observations. In addition, we generated 20 random samples of 90 GC firms (85 for the propensity score matched sample), and reran our regressions. The coefficients for the first-time GCOs are positively significant in all the models. The coefficients for recurring GCOs are significant in 9 out of the 20 random samples drawn from the full sample, and 17 out of 20 random samples drawn from the matched samples. 27 For the sake of brevity, we have not presented the coefficient estimates for the control variables in Table 5 . They are similar to those presented in Table 4 . 28 The modified Easton (2004) model defines cost of equity as p t ¼ (eps tþ2 þ r Ã dps tþ1 À eps tþ1 )/r 2 , where dps t ¼ dividend per share paid during year t. The Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model defines cost of equity as r ¼ a þ sqrt (a 2 þ (eps tþ1 /p t )(g 2 À (r f À 0.03))), where a ¼ 0.5 Ã ((r f À 0.03) þ dps tþ1 /p t ); g 2 ¼ (eps tþ2 À eps tþ1 )/eps tþ1 ; and r f ¼ risk-free rate equal to the yield on a ten-year Treasury note in June of year t. Following prior research (e.g., Chen, Jorgensen, and Yoo 2004, 328) , we set dividends equal to 0 if the information is missing. **, *** Significant at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed).
The coefficients and t-statistics for the control variables are not reported for brevity.
(continued on next page) The coefficients and t-statistics for the control variables are not reported for brevity.
(continued on next page) *, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed).
Subperiods
Because our sample period includes the recession in the early 2000s, the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), and the 2008 financial crisis, we divide our data into subperiods and conduct separate analyses. Panel C of Table 5 presents our results for The association between a first-time GC opinion (GCOFT) and subsequent cost of equity is significant and positive for the full and propensity matched samples using both the parsimonious and extended models for all subperiods, with p-value , 0.05. However, while the association between GCORECUR and subsequent cost of equity is significant and positive for all subperiods using the parsimonious model, it is significant for only one subperiod (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) ) using the extended model. Taken as a whole, our subperiod analyses indicate a significant positive association between GC opinion and subsequent cost of equity.
Change Analysis
The observed association between the GC opinion and COE could result from other unobserved cross-sectional factors that are correlated with either or both variables. To rule out this possibility, we conduct a change analysis by comparing the change in COE from year tÀ1 to year t for firms with and without GC opinions. We include separate variables for companies that had a clean opinion in year tÀ1 and a GC opinion in year t (NGCO-GCO) and companies that had a GC opinion in year tÀ1 and a clean opinion in year t (GCO-NGCO). The base group comprises companies that had the same reports in both years (i.e., NGCO-NGCO or GCO-GCO). The control variables are specified in change (year t À year tÀ1 ) form. Table 6 presents the results of our multivariate model. NGCO-GCO has a significant positive coefficient across all four columns, indicating that the receipt of a first-time GC opinion is associated with an increase in cost of capital. The magnitude of increase in COE ranges from 3.3 percent to 5.7 percent. Companies whose auditors drop the GC opinion (GCO-NGCO) do not experience a decrease in COE. One explanation for the insignificant result is that the market remains skeptical about the financial condition of such firms even after the GC opinion is removed. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that this result may be due to the small sample size for this group. Among the control variables, ChLSIZE is significant in all four models. ChBETA, ChVAR, ChRECRET, ChPRBANK, ChBIAS, and ChPLOSS are significant in some of the models in the expected directions. 29 29 We also computed the statistical power of the models in Tables 4-6 using the ''post hoc analyses'' in G Ã Power3, a statistical power analysis program (see Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, and Buchner [2007] for details). The power of a test is ''the probability that the test would reject the null hypothesis when it is false by a given magnitude'' (Craswell, Stokes, and Laughton 2002) . First, we used the partial R 2 for GCO and GCOFT in Table 4 , GCOFT in Table 5 , and NGCO-GCO in Table 6 to compute the effect size where the effect size is the ''degree to which the phenomenon is present in the population'' (Mazen, Hemmasi, and Lewis 1987; Borkowski, Welsh, and Zhang 2001) . For our study, the ''phenomenon'' is that the GC opinion is associated with cost of equity. Next we used the computed effect size, the actual sample size, and the number of predictors as the inputs to compute the power. Of the 40 models, 36 (90 percent) have a power of greater than 0.70 (mean ¼ 0.86, median ¼ 0.94; Q1 ¼ 0.80, Q3 ¼ 0.98) and the power exceeds the conventional threshold of 0.80 (Mazen et al. 1987) for 75 percent of the models. However, the power for the matched sample extended model for the first-time GC opinion (Table 4 , Panel B, Column 6) is 0.55. The power for the three matched sample extended models (Table 5, The observed association between GCO and cost of equity capital could be driven by firms' poor performance. We address this issue using the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure. The first stage comprises a probit regression of GCO on its determinants: PRBANK, LOSS, LSIZE, BETA, RMSE, RECRET, and BIG N. 31 In the second stage, we use the estimates from this regression to estimate the inverse Mills ratio, and include it in our main regression to control for the likelihood of self-selection into the GCO group. We find that the coefficient (untabulated) on GCO remains significantly positive with p-value , 0.01 for the full and matched samples, using both the parsimonious and extended models. The inverse Mills ratio is significant in the full sample but not in the matched sample.
Subsequent Viability
Blay and Geiger (2001) document that, after controlling for previously developed variables proxying for expectations of the GC opinion (for example, probability of bankruptcy), subsequent viability of the firm is associated with the market reaction to the GCO. As an additional analysis, we control for subsequent viability.
32 Following Blay and Geiger (2001) , we define firms that filed for bankruptcy within two years after the fiscal year in which their financial statements contained a going concern opinion as subsequently not viable. 33 After controlling for subsequent viability, we *, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). # We did not include this variable because there is no observation in this category. a The dependent variable is the change in the COE between the year before the first-time GC opinion and the year after the first-time GC opinion. b We include seven industry dummy variables using the classification reported in Panel C of Table 1 . c We use ten year dummy variables for the years 2001-2010. Variables with the prefix ''Ch'' are the change variables. BN-BN ¼ Big N auditor in both years tÀ1 and t; BN-NBN ¼ Big N auditor in year tÀ1 and non-Big N auditor in year t; NBN-BN ¼ Non-Big N auditor in year tÀ1 and Big N auditor in year t. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 30 For simplicity and to ensure that the tests are based on a sufficient number of GC observations, in this and subsequent sections, we have presented our results for the combined GCO (first-time and recurring) variable. 31 Although we use the propensity score matching procedure to address the issue of bias, as Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2012) caution, it should not be viewed as a replacement for the Heckman selection model. ''An advantage of propensity score matching (PSM) is that there is no MILLS variable and so the researcher is not required to find valid Z variables. However, such matching has two important limitations. First, selection is assumed to occur only on observable characteristics. That is, the error term in the first stage model is correlated with the independent variables in the second stage (i.e., u is correlated with X and/or Z), but there is no selection on unobservables (i.e., u and t are uncorrelated). In contrast, the purpose of the selection model is to control for endogeneity that arises from unobservables (i.e., the correlation between u and t)'' (Lennox et al. 2012) . 32 Blay and Geiger (2001) define their subsequent viability variable BKT as 1 if the firm is bankrupt, and 0 otherwise.
They classify firms as viable ''only if they did not file for bankruptcy during the subsequent two years'' (Blay and Geiger 2001, 215) . Based on this information, we treated firms that filed for bankruptcy within two years after the fiscal year in which their financial statements contained a going concern opinion as subsequently not viable. 33 We were unable to locate information for nine (three) observations in the full (matched) sample, possibly because these companies became bankrupt, were acquired, or went private. The remaining companies either continued to receive GC opinions or received clean opinions.
find that GCO is positive and significant in the full and matched samples, using both the parsimonious and extended models.
Financing and Debt-Related Issues
Menon and Williams (2010) find that significant GCO price responses occur primarily among clients experiencing financing difficulties and/or violations of covenants that require GCO-free financial statements. These reactions suggest that investors are responding to ''potential increases in the cost of capital rather than to imminent bankruptcy or delisting'' (Menon and Williams 2010) . To examine whether the cost of equity is different for companies with and without financing/debt related issues, we separate GCO observations into two groups: (1) those for which the company made reference to financing problems, had debt covenant violations, or was close to violating a covenant (DFGCO); and (2) other GC opinions (OGCO).
34 Contrary to our expectation, the coefficient on OGCO is significant in all four models while the coefficient on DFGCO is significant only for the parsimonious model in the full sample.
Institutional Ownership
Menon and Williams (2010) observe an inverse relationship between the price reaction to GC opinions and institutional ownership (INSTOWN). As a sensitivity test, we include institutional ownership in our models. The number of GC observations was significantly reduced (72 in the full parsimonious model sample, 51 in the full extended model sample, 51 in the matched parsimonious model sample, and 48 in the matched extended model sample) because of missing institutional ownership data. When we include INSTOWN in the model, GCO is significant in both the parsimonious and extended models; INSTOWN is not significant. Further, when we add an interaction term GCO Ã INSTOWN to the model in the full sample, the interaction (but not the individual variables GCO and INSTOWN), is significantly positive for both the parsimonious and expanded models (p , 0.01 and p ¼ 0.033, respectively, one-tailed). This suggests that COE increases with institutional ownership in situations where a GC opinion is present. In the matched parsimonious model sample, both GCO and INSTOWN are significant and the interaction (GCO Ã  INSTOWN) is not significant. In the matched extended model sample (which has only 48 GCO observations), none of the three variables (GCO, INSTOWN, or GCO Ã INSTOWN) is significant.
Auditor's Opinion on Internal Control
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires auditors of accelerated filers to audit their clients' internal controls in addition to auditing their financial statements. Accordingly, auditors issue two separate opinions for their clients-one on the fairness of the financial statements and one on the effectiveness of internal controls. Material weaknesses on internal control (MW) may cast doubts about the quality of the financial statements. Furthermore, material weaknesses may suggest that a client faces greater operating risk. These consequences can drive a positive relationship between MWs and the firm's cost of capital, as investors demand a greater return from companies with MWs. Prior studies have examined how the market responds to internal control deficiencies through their impact on the cost of equity Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009 ). show that, on average, internal control weaknesses are not associated with a higher cost of equity. However, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) find that internal control 34 The numbers of DFGCOs (OGCOs) are as follows: 33 (81), 29 (35), 31 (75), and 30 (33) for the firms used in the estimates for the full sample parsimonious, full sample extended, matched sample parsimonious, and matched sample extended models, respectively.
weaknesses are important to investors and that the cost of equity increases when a firm reports internal control weaknesses. Beneish, Billings, and Hodder (2008) re-examine the association between internal control weaknesses and cost of equity. They find no market reaction to Section 404 disclosures.
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To examine whether our results are affected by the auditor's opinion on internal control, we add a dummy variable (MW), coded 1 if the auditor issued an adverse report on the client's internal control due to the existence of material weaknesses, and 0 otherwise. Since Section 404 of SOX became effective in November of 2004 and was restricted to accelerated filers, we also restrict the sample period to [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] , and the sample to accelerated filers. The coefficient on GC opinion (not tabulated) continues to be positively associated with COE. However, the coefficient on MW is not significant in either of the models in the two samples.
CONCLUSION
This study examines the link between the issuance of a GC opinion and the cost of equity capital. A strong association between a GC opinion and the cost of capital would suggest that the market deems GC opinions to be informative. By contrast, an insignificant association between a GC opinion and the cost of capital would suggest that the market may be able to derive the information contained in a GC opinion prior to the issuance of the report, or that the GC opinion is uninformative. Since a GC opinion signals that a firm's going concern assumption is being violated, we expected the signaled risk to drive a positive association between a GC opinion and the cost of capital.
We find that there is indeed a statistically significant positive association between GC opinion and the cost of equity. The increase in COE varies between 3.3 percent and 5.7 percent, which is economically significant. This is consistent with the notion that when investors, informed by the GC opinion, believe a company will go bankrupt, they act to protect their interests by demanding a greater rate of return-which then increases the company's cost of equity. In other words, the greater investment risk, as signaled by a GC opinion, leads to an increased cost of equity.
In addition to being relevant to policy discussions, our results are also timely. The debate over whether auditors should be responsible for issuing a GC opinion has existed since the 1970s (Bellovary, Giacomino, and Akers 2006) . The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (Cohen Commission) recommended that if a company's financial statements contained adequate disclosure about the going concern uncertainty, then the auditors should not be required to refer to it in their audit reports (CAR 1978, 30) . Since then, the standard setters have increased auditors' responsibilities by requiring auditors to assess the going concern ability of a client in every audit (AICPA 1988) . Despite the increase in responsibilities, the going concern opinion has been relatively rare. 36 The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) is [2009] for a discussion of the differences between the requirements of Sections 302 and 404.) We include only Section 404 opinions, and therefore our results are consistent with the findings reported in and Beneish et al. (2008) . 36 In his speech on the day the PCAOB issued the concept release, Steven Harris, a Board member, pointed out that the auditors rarely use going concern modification in the audit report. ''Out of the ten largest bankruptcies during the financial crisis, only two had going concern opinions. During the year leading up to their bankruptcy filings, the market capitalization of the eight companies without going concern opinions declined from a collective $75.5 billion in the year prior to their respective bankruptcy filings to a collective market capitalization of just under $700 million at the time of their filing-a 99 percent loss in investor value. In addition to the $75 billion decline in equity market capitalization, fixed income investors faced even greater losses, potentially amounting to over $200 billion in public debt issued by these eight companies prior to their bankruptcy filings'' (Harris 2011) .
